IPP Sentences: A Beacon of Hope

On the 12th of June 2026, the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in R v Davis [2026] EWCA Crim 743. It should give new hope to many of those currently serving IPP and DPP sentences and to those who are still subject to them.

Imprisonment for Public Protection (IPP) and Detention for Public Protection (DPP) (for those under 18) were sentences introduced by the New Labour government in the Dangerous Offender provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Between the 4th of April 2005 and the 13th of July 2008, if an offender aged over 18 at the time of the commission of the offence had previously been convicted of a specified offence, then the court had to assume he or she was a dangerous offender, unless it was unreasonable to do so. If an offender aged 18 or over was found dangerous, the sentencing judge had no option but to impose an IPP, unless the offence and offender warranted a life sentence.

Under this first iteration of the legislation, for those aged under 18 at the time of the offence, the Dangerous Offender provisions were slightly different. There was no assumption of dangerousness and if found to be a dangerous offender it was not mandatory to impose a sentence of detention for public protection (DPP). It was open to sentencers to impose an extended sentence rather than DPP if an extended sentence would give sufficient protection to members of the public in future.

It wasn’t until judgment in R v Lang [2006] 2 Cr App R (S) 3 was handed down in early November 2005 that any guidance was given as to the assumption of dangerousness and what was meant by ‘unreasonable to do so’. The court in Lang set out a number of matters that sentencers should take into account before assessing an offender as dangerous and, in the case of those under 18, before imposing a DPP. One of the factors highlighted by the court was that “when sentencing young offenders, to bear in mind that, within a shorter time than adults, they may change and develop. This and their level of maturity may be highly pertinent when assessing what their future conduct may be and whether it may give rise to significant risk of serious harm.” In part because at the start of the paragraph in which this was said there was reference to those under 18, this important factor was usually overlooked by judges sentencing young people who had turned 18.

Lang was followed by the decision in R v Johnson [2007] 1 WLR 585, which is generally regarded as narrowing the circumstances in which an appeal might succeed. In that case the court held that it would not “normally interfere with the conclusions reached by a sentencer who has accurately identified the relevant principles, and applied his mind to the relevant facts”.

In 2008 there was some recognition that IPP sentences were being handed down more readily than was intended and the dangerousness provisions were amended by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. The assumption of dangerousness based on previous offending was removed. IPP was no longer mandatory on a finding of dangerousness and an offender could receive either a determinate sentence or an extended sentence if an IPP was not warranted. In addition, an IPP could not be imposed unless a defendant had either a previous conviction for a specified offence or the offence warranted a minimum term of at least 2 years (which was the equivalent of a determinate term of 4 years).

By 2012 it was recognised that the IPP/DPP sentence was not fit for purpose and the coalition government abolished it on 3 December 2012, whilst still keeping the remainder of the Dangerous Offender provisions. Regrettably though, for all those who were made subject to IPPs and DPPs, the abolition of the sentence was not retrospective.

After 2012 there were a flurry of appeals against IPP sentences. Most were unsuccessful. In R v Roberts and others [2016] EWCA Crim 71, a specially convened court made it clear that where a judge had “passed a sentence of IPP in circumstances where it was properly open to the judge to pass such a sentence, this court will not now revisit sentences of IPP on the bases argued in these applications. Unless clear new points are raised, the court will in all such cases in the future simply refuse an extension of time without more.” The Court of Appeal took the view that if anything was to be done about IPP sentences, it was a matter for Parliament; the court was a court of review and would only intervene where there had been an identifiable error in the sentencing process. Whilst Roberts narrowed the scope for appeals, there were still some successes in challenging IPP and DPP sentences. However, many offenders languished in prison either having never been released on licence or having been recalled due to breaches of licence or further offending which often did not mirror the offending for which the IPP/DPP was imposed.

By 2022, the Parliamentary Justice Committee recognised that the IPP regime was “irredeemably flawed” and had become a “stain” on the criminal justice system. The Committee recommended a full resentencing programme for those affected. But still nothing was or has been done to address the situation that IPP prisoners found themselves in.

However, over the last couple of years the Court of Appeal has appeared to have taken a slightly different approach than in the past to IPP/DPP appeals. In particular they have recognised the extent to which young people may wrongly have been made the subject of IPPs and DPPs. In a number of appeals over the last two years IPPs/DPPs have been quashed because the sentencing judge failed to have proper regard - when it came to both the assessment of dangerousness and the decision as to whether to impose an IPP/DPP or an extended sentence - to the appellant’s relatively young age and the fact that they were more likely to mature and develop in a short period of time than an adult offender, such that their future risk would be reduced.

This fresh approach by the Court of Appeal has led to the Criminal Cases Review Commission setting up a dedicated unit to reconsider their previously rejected applications for review of IPP/DPP sentences, and more recently it has led to the Court of Appeal convening another ‘special court’ (Davis), presided over by the Vice President of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, to draw together the principles that should from now on be applied to IPP/DPP appeals.

What we can take from Davis (much of which is not actually new), are the following points:

• Judges and advocates in the Crown Court did not always understand the law regarding IPPs and DPPs, and on occasion got it wrong;
• There was often confusion with regards to the change in the law in 2008, and around that time some judges and advocates proceeded as if the first iteration of the dangerousness provisions were still in force;
• Age of the offender at the date of commission of the offence is a “critical factor”;
• Very often there was insufficient regard given to an offender’s ‘young age’ at the time of the commission of the offence and at sentence;
• ‘Young age’ applies at least up until an offender is 21, and arguably up to the age of 25;
• The principles that are now commonly recognised as being essential to the sentencing of young people (found most readily in the Sentencing Children and Young People Guideline) will be applied by the Court of Appeal when considering IPP/DPP cases, because they were foreshadowed in legislation and in earlier case law going back as far as Lang, and were binding on sentencing judges at the time;
• "The court should be less pessimistic in assessing future risk when dealing with a young person with a capacity for rehabilitation and reform which may not exist for an older offender”;
• Simple reference to a young person’s age is not enough; there must be evidence that the sentencer “truly took into account the age and level of maturity of the offender both when making a finding of dangerousness and, if appropriate, when deciding whether to impose an indeterminate sentence in consequence of that finding”;
• The correct, stepped approach, from bottom up, where an IPP was not a mandatory consequence of a finding of dangerousness is: life sentence, determinate sentence, extended sentence, IPP/DPP as a last resort;
• There needs to be evidence of proper consideration having been given to alternatives to an IPP/DPP before such a sentence can be justified. A ‘glancing reference’ to the alternatives is not enough;
• The Court of Appeal will have regard to whether a package of protective measures as an alternative to IPP/DPP would at the time have met the risk posed, regardless of the fact that such a package may not now be of any effect if the IPP/DPP were quashed;
• The Court of Appeal will be slow to take into account events post-sentence that may cast a negative light on an offender, because it is recognised that indeterminate sentences can have a detrimental effect on an offender and may in themselves be the reason behind such misconduct. Therefore reasons for recall and further offending are unlikely to have an impact on the merits of an appeal; and
• IPPs/DPPs imposed even for very serious offences can and will be quashed.

Experience has shown that those subject to IPP/DPP sentences often do not realise that they may have grounds on which to appeal their sentence, even though they are many many years ‘out of time’. Some did not receive appropriate advice. Many did not appreciate the practical effect of the indeterminate sentence, and that they could remain incarcerated long after they had served their minimum term, or be recalled for what may appear to be trivial matters. For some the futility of their situation has led to a feeling of hopelessness and inaction. And a significant number have already appealed and had their appeals refused, and have had their applications to the CCRC rejected. However, there is now a beacon of hope.

Whether you have never enquired about the possibility of appealing your IPP/DPP sentence, have previously received negative advice, have had an appeal refused or an application to the CCRC rejected now is the time to seek fresh advice on the merits of an appeal against sentence.

Nick Beechey and Gavin Rose of BK Law (previously Wells Burcombe) represented the appellant Stuart O’Neill in R v Davis [2026] EWCA Crim 743 and have been representing IPP/DPP prisoners in the Court of Appeal for many years. They are the only barrister/solicitor combination to have represented clients in the last two 'special courts’ convened to consider IPP/DPP sentences (Roberts and Davis) and recently have been successful in a number of IPP appeals.